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Collision Law in the Next Millennium
Joseph C. Sweeney*
The Article predicts-basedon present trends-whatmaritime transportmay be like in
the year 2025. Larger vessels will speed across the oceans, but their increased electronic
wizardry will not bring an end to the recurringnightmare of collisions in crowded seas. The
IMO may achieve neardictatorialpowers to regulate vessel navigation and controlpollution of
the air and sea. In many ways vessels operationsmay resemble those traditionalfor aircraft,
while expectations ofprivacy no longerexist Human errorcan still be counted on to produce
careless decisions that cause damage to one great ship and the total loss of another,with
accompanyingpersonalinjuriesand cago damage.

In 1887, Edward Bellamy, an American lawyer and author
published his utopian novel, LookingBackward-2000-1887,in which
he attempted to portray the American scene in 2000.' Over one
million copies of the book were rapidly sold. Several of his
predictions regarding social life in an industrial society are evident
today, but his visionary socialism has not emerged.
Like Bellamy, this Article shall attempt to predict the future. Our
time frame is much shorter than his and our subject matter-vessel
collision and the limitation of shipowner liability-is different. Rather
than hibernating for 113 years and "looking backward," this Article
shall use the example of a voyage of a liner service vessel from New
York to Rotterdam in 2025, describing the problems encountered.
Welcome aboard!
The U.S. flag vessel M/V OLERON STAR is a large, fast
container-carrier, 70,000 gross tons, 900-foot length by 120-foot
breadth with capacity to carry 5,000 new eighty-foot by eight-foot by
eight foot containers, now constructed of a super-strength plastic. The
containers are wheeled so as to roll-on and roll-off the ship; the total
time to load and unload is only four hours at each port. The vessel is
thus loaded almost automatically at its New York Harbor pier (actually
in New Jersey). The vessel is operated by a Master, a chief mate, three
junior mates and seven crew members. The corporate owner, Star
Shipping Co. of New York has instantaneous communication with the
ship and keeps a precise plot of the ship's location at all times together
*
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with all the inputs to the ship's electronic navigation charts, thanks to
satellite communication.
Prior to sailing and before loading, the vessel had tied up to the
special electric-charge station for a new charge to be added to its
submarine-type electric batteries required, by the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) Pollution Prevention Regulations,
which require electric power to be put in operation within New York
Harbor and at a radius of 100 miles from the Ambrose Light Station.
At the Eastern end of the projected voyage, battery propulsion is again
required by the IMO regulation in the English Channel from a line
drawn between Penzance (Cornwall), England, and Ushant or
Ouessant Isle (Brittany), France. Propulsion by polluting fossil fuels is
forbidden in these pollution-free zones.2
The vessel had also taken on its more traditional form of bunkers,
an alcohol and kerosene preparation that can be mixed with seawater
and burned by the modified jet engines during open ocean sailing.
Navigation out of the Port of New York will be under the
direction of the Federal Port Safety Authority (FPSA) (part of the U.S.
Coast Guard) whose high-definition radars and computers have taken
the place of harbor pilots. Masters of vessels are required to follow the
directions of FPSA when preceded by the words "You are ordered to
.... " Violation of these orders is enforced by the Coast Guard in U.S.
courts. In addition to its capacity for forward propulsion at forty to
fifty knots, the vessel has omni-directional pushing capacity, making it
unnecessary to have the assistance of tug boats and docking masters
during the close maneuvers coming up to the pier.
The vessel's open ocean navigation is under the direction of the
IMO's International Safety Enforcement Directorate (ISED) which
controls the mandated multi-lane highways for vessels crossing the
Atlantic Ocean in either direction. For this eastbound voyage the
vessel will be directed to proceed at the speed of twenty knots from
Point Alpha 2001 (the Ambrose Light Station) to Point Alpha 2002
(offNantucket Island), then to Point Alpha 2003 (west of Cape Cod),
which is the navigational gateway for Route A2000 of the IMO
Atlantic Route system. Point Alpha 2003 is the first navigational
checkpoint in a series of 12 checkpoints about 300 miles apart until the
first European checkpoint off the Irish coast (Point Alpha 2015) is
reached, also under the ISED. The most important function for the
2.
The battery operational requirement continues through the English Channel to a
line drawn between Great Yarmouth (Norfolk), England, and the port of Den Helder,
Netherlands.
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master, assisted by the chief mate, is to correctly program the ship's
Internal Navigation System with the correct latitude and longitude for
New York, the correct Eastbound navigational gateway (Point Alpha
2003), and the correct preprogrammed voyage plan (Alpha 2000) for
destination Rotterdam, spelled out in a voyage plan that has been
previously filed with the ISED. The correctly filed inputs will then
automatically feed the required information for the ship's electronic
navigation chart (mandated by the IMO) and set the equipment known
as "the black box" or Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) (also mandated by
the IMO). Sensors in the ship will record more than 100 parameters
that will automatically amend the navigation program for
unanticipated changes in winds, currents, or engine performance.3 The
100-sensor inputs plus information about courses and speeds made
good, together with pitch, roll, and yaw information will all be
recorded in the vessel's "black box" contained in a waterproof,
damage-resistant container that is then attached to an orange-colored
flotation device. Furthermore, a continuous videotape of the pilot
house is kept in its own waterproof damage-resistant container,
recording all movements, conversations, and orders in the pilot house
during the voyage. In the pilot house, the conning officer has
immediate control of the ship's engines and steering mechanisms,
without any engine-order telegraph.
The video camera in the pilot house will record the entire voyage
of three days. Thirty additional cameras are at work in the ship
continuously recording twenty-four hours of observations. The openocean sailing speed varies from forty to fifty knots, finally beating the
three-day ten-hour speed record of the S.S. UNITED STATES made
on July 7, 1952. In fact, the ocean-crossing in three days has brought
back valuable cargoes that had been traveling by air for many years.
The problem for the ocean-surface vessel in the future will be
competition from the huge lighter-than-air structures (blimps) now
being constructed with nuclear power, which will make the Atlantic
crossing in two days.
While engaged in open-ocean sailing under the ISED, all vessels
registered with the directorate-in other words, all passenger and
cargo ships of 300 gross tons or more-must travel only in the
mandated traffic lanes listed in the ship's voyage plan; thus, the
chances of an open-ocean collision with a similar vessel are greatly
3.

Flight Data Recorders on the "Concorde V" aircraft read more than 200 in-flight

parameters during the ninety-minute crossing at speeds above Mach Two from New York to
Paris.
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reduced. Nevertheless, the IMO has been unable to persuade
governments to require vessels under 300 tons-mostly private
pleasure craft, tugs and service craft-to sail only in the traffic lanes
mandated by IMO. Problems will also occur in the approaches to busy
ports where several different multi-lane highways converge from
different directions-as in Rotterdam.
On March 18, 2025, the MIV OLERON STAR was proceeding
generally eastward in the English Channel when she entered the
ISED's enlarged Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) that had
originally been established in 1967 by IMCO as a traffic separation
scheme. In this scheme, the French side is reserved for eastbound
traffic and the English side is reserved for westbound traffic with a
median line between the two schemes clearly shown on the electronic
charts in use and on the ISED's radars located at Dover. From there,
the officers
of ISED direct the movements of all traffic in the
4
Channel.
At 0400 on March 18, 2025, the MN OLERON STAR was
proceeding on true course 068 at speed of twenty knots. The Master
and the chief officer were on the bridge because they expected to make
Rotterdam Harbor later that morning, and the Master was uneasy
about the heavy traffic in the channel. There was a crew member
standing by the helm, but the automatic pilot was engaged. 5 At 0430,
the MN OLERON STAR's officers noted a patchy fog situation and
observed intermittently the two -white masthead lights and the green
side light of a ship that would later be identified as the M/T VISBY
EXPRESS at an apparent distance of three miles, confirmed by ARPA.
The ship's ARPA was equipped with FLIR (forward-looking
infra radar) providing a clear picture of the entire navigational picture
to the observant mariner. Unhappily, no one was in continuous or
even frequent observation with these state-of-the-art devices.
At no time did these officers hear fog signals. The M/IT VISBY
EXPRESS appeared to be crossing the intended course of the MN
OLERON STAR from port to starboard; accordingly, the MN
OLERON STAR's Master ordered a course change from 068 degrees
to 078 degrees-an alteration of ten degrees to starboard. MV
OLERON STAR continued on this course while the Master attempted
to contact the office of his port agent at Rotterdam to discuss recent
4.
As with the directives of the FPSA at New York, violations of directions to
masters preceded by the words, "You are ordered to . . ." are enforceable by IMO's Safety
Enforcement Directorate in the Tribunal of IMO by fine and suspension of navigation
privileges of the vessel and her officers.
5.
Normally the mate on watch also serves as look-out and helmsman.
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problems in discharging procedures. When the M/V OLERON
STAR's Master looked up from his conversation, the M/T VISBY
EXPRESS was less than a half-mile away. Because New York time
was six hours behind local time, there was no one at the Star Shipping
Co. Office checking the navigation of the MV OLERON STAR.
The MiT VISBY EXPRESS was an older vessel of Panamanian
registry of 20,000 gross tons, 600-feet long, and 80 feet in beam with a
cargo of bagged grain and rare essential oils on a voyage from
Rotterdam to New York, proceeding on a true course of 240 degrees,
having left Rotterdam at 0100 on the eighteenth. The third mate had
the corn, but the ship was on automatic pilot, making about 15 knots
in heavy fog and sounding fog signals. Both course and speed had
been approved by the M/T VISBY EXPRESS's Master before he
retired, although he would later testify that his night order directed that
speed be reduced if fog signals were sounded. No reduction in speed
occurred. At about 0420, the MR VISBY EXPRESS's third mate
looked at the ARPA scope and observed a contact that would be the
MN OLERON STAR on the starboard bow, then seven miles distant.
Recalling the Master's order that the M/T VISBY EXPRESS was not
to close a contact at a distance of less than five miles, the third officer
altered course to port five degrees from 240 degrees to 235 degrees, at
which point he went into the adjacent chart room to get a cup of hot
coffee. On returning to the bridge a few minutes later, he was startled
to observe that the distance to the contact was now less than three
miles, and at constant bearing. The third officer altered course to port
again by 4 degrees from 235 degrees to 231 degrees. It gradually
occurred to the third officer that there was risk of collision, as he could
now clearly see the two white masthead lights and the red side light of
the MV OLERON STAR at a distance of less than two miles and
closing. At this point he went to the Intercom and cried, "Master on
the Bridge, Pleeeeze!"
The MRT VISBY EXPRESS's Master
responded within seconds and immediately blew the five short-blast
danger signal, ordered the helm at first hard starboard and then hard
port. Collision inevitably followed at 0438 on March 18,2025.
ISED's radar plots are recorded and preserved for a limited time,
and the officers on watch at the ISED station at Dover will testify that
the MN OLERON STAR was just barely on her right side of the
VTMS separating line, but the M/T VISBY EXPRESS had crossed
into the same traffic lane as the MV OLERON STAR and was not
navigating on her proper side of the VTMS line. In terms of the 1972
COLREGS, as amended, the navigational situation when each vessel
was in sight of the other was a crossing situation. This was also
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obvious from the ARPA, if attention had been paid by bridge
personnel on both ships. While there was considerable traffic in the
English Channel at the time of collision, it did not appear that the
navigation of the two colliding vessels had been impaired by the
presence of other vessels.
In the collision, the bow of the M/V OLERON STAR struck the
starboard side of the M/T VISBY EXPRESS forward of the central
bridge area at an angle of about forty degrees. It was a deep
penetration, piercing both of the double hulls of the MiT VISBY
EXPRESS and reached the port deep tanks, from which the oil cargo
escaped as the waves permitted the ship to rise and fall. The additional
sea water rapidly compromised the seaworthiness of the M/T VISBY
EXPRESS. An emergency call for assistance was not answered, as the
only available salvor was engaged on another job and was not
available. The Master, officers and crew of the M/T VISBY
EXPRESS were able to transfer to the MV OLERON STAR before
she sank, with several serious personal injuries. A large portion of the
oil cargo spilled out before the MIT VISBY EXPRESS sank; this
would eventually wash up on the coast of England near the Brighton
resort because of the prevailing tides and currents. A clotted mass of
polluted sea weed and heavy oil floated to the beaches, killing
hundreds of sea birds and forcing closure of the beaches with great
financial loss to the seaside hotels and restaurants. Finally, as a result
of the force of the collision, four containers of the M/V OLERON
STAR were cast overboard and lost.
Since the last P & I Club "demutualized" and became a
traditional fixed-premium insurance company, there had been a merger
of these insurers with cargo insurers so that questions of cargo damage
would not be litigated under the revised Hamburg Rules, leaving only
the question of responsibility for the collision between the shipowners
to be decided by litigation or arbitration.
The American owners of the MIV OLERON STAR briefly
considered litigation in Panama or Greece, but rejected those
possibilities. The Greek owners of the M/T VISBY EXPRESS
immediately rejected the possibility of litigation in New York where
the waiting list for trial of a nonjury civil action exceeded ten years.
Furthermore, limitation of shipowner liability was no longer a
factor in U.S. courts. Because of the satellite communication between
the M/V OLERON STAR's bridge and the corporate owner, it became
impossible to establish the absence of privity or knowledge. Congress
finally excluded personal injury and death claims from the American
statute in 2010 and repealed the entire statute in 2015. Thereafter, the
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United States Supreme Court held that U.S. courts could not apply any
foreign limitation of shipowner liability because Congress had stated a
public policy eliminating all forms of limitation of liability in transport
law.
Both owners and their hull insurers are investigating the
possibility of trial before the Law of the Sea Tribunal at Hamburg,
established in 1997 under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, where the jurisdiction has been expanded to include
civil litigation dealing with collision, pollution, and other maritime
disasters. The masters and watch officers of both the polluting and the
colliding vessels will face criminal prosecution in the United
Kingdom, the United States, or Panama, or before the IMO Tribunal.
Heavy fines and suspension of licenses can be anticipated.
Predictions often collide with changed circumstances, random
events, and new technologies. Twenty-five years ago who could have
predicted the widespread use of personal computers, cellular phones,
and the Intemet? Who can tell how many of the above predictions
will come true? It will be time to review them at the Tulane
University Admiralty Law Institute in 2025.

